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Text: 
 
The Defence Industry and Technology Base (DTIB): the development and production of armaments  
Since its creation, one of WEU's responsibilities was its role in controlling the land-based conventional 
military assets of member countries. The WEU Council, though it was theoretically permitted to do, did 
not make use of the modified Brussels treaty provisions to establish any role for the ACA to control 
Atomic, Biological or Chemical (ABC) weapons. The Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA), 
established on May 7th 1955, was responsible for presenting the results of is audits to the WEU 
Assembly annually. In contrast to the ACA's auditing duties, in 1955, the Standing Armaments 
Committee (SAC) of the WEU was also formed in 1955, as an attempt to try to influence the 
procurement and production of defence materiel. The objective was to standardise general European 
military commitments, integration and effectiveness.  The role of ACA may therefore be described as 
that of a confidence and cooperation builder for its members, to help stabilize and unify Europe, while 
SAC's role was to encourage industrial and technological growth, innovation and cooperation at the 
European level.  
WEU members stated the need for greater cooperation in arms production in order to prevent Europe 
from falling behind in terms of technological development. However, a reoccurring obstacle to achieving 
cooperation in the field of arms production came either from individual members' desire to maintain a 
certain level of political independence in military affairs, or because they lacked the necessary domestic 
market and manufacturing capabilities to make such projects economically feasible.  
A survey of British and French government records relating to the coordination of arms production 
reveals that for the British, a significant concern was lowering costs. For the French, a concern was 
establishing weapons' production outside the sphere of NATO and the US. Another tendency on the part 
of the British and French governments on this issue was their alternating enthusiasm for, and then pull-
back from, the bodies they established to support coordinated weapons production. Their recognition of 
the need to support European technological development and R&D, in addition to the desire to protect 
West European manufacturing, would generate support for revitalizing an existing organ, such as SAC, or 
the creation of a new on such as the Independent European Program Group (IEPG). However, domestic 
political interests in addition to practical issues relating to the implementation of these programs would 
impede their work and progress, leading to the stalling and at times dissolution of these organs.  
Notwithstanding the obstacles to the Control and Production of Arms in Western Europe, WEU 
succeeded in gathering and communicating significant amounts a data relating to the conventional arms 
levels and requirements of its members, and the IEPG did succeed in organizing a number of joint arms 
projects.  
The following chart shows the various organizations which were involved in the control and conception 
of armaments at the European level.  
WEU CPA/SCA-1955 ACA-1955 IEPG-1976  
NATO EUROGROUP  
FINABEL (independent) 
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Production of arms  
Throughout its existence the WEU attempted to streamline and coordinate the design and production of 
armaments between members. On May 7th 1955, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) was 
formed to promote consultation and cooperation in the production of armaments, the intention being 
to lead to a European arms industry that simultaneously encouraged technological development and 
industrial production. Another role was to develop close links with NATO and to help member nations of 
both NATO and WEU meet their arms requirements. SAC became a forum for member states to present 
their armaments needs and projects, and to look for production partners. SAC was located in Paris to be 
close to NATO offices in order to more easily fulfil its purpose and to establish closer links with NATO 
and facilitating the efforts of member nations to find common solutions to satisfy their national 
armaments' needs.    
A precursor to SAC, FINBEL, was set up in late 1953 independently from the WEU and NATO, in order to 
assist European Army leaders, to have better coordination procuring land weapons, and when West 
Germany joined in 1956, its acronym was changed to FINABEL. FINABEL did not involve itself in 
production, but acted mainly to help coordinate concepts and specifications for European armaments, 
doing so without having the power to issue binding recommendations. SAC had to report to the WEU 
Council twice per year, and through the framework of the WEU General Secretariat, to cooperate with 
FINABEL Both the SAC and FINABEL worked closely with NATO, and contributed to improving 
operational standards between European armies and NATO partners, however SAC's impact was 
confined to operational research and to evaluating military  materiel and technical experiments. Though 
no equipment was developed in this context, the SAC facilitated links being created between industry, 
research, government officials and the military to deal with equipment needs. The preferred method of 
solving these issues was through bi-lateral and multilateral accords to coordinate production between 
WEU and NATO members. The results of the SAC's work can be seen in the joint European defence 
projects such as the design and production of the Eurofighter and the Eurocopter, which were 
completed later, under the framework of the IEPG.  
Eurogroup, a NATO associated European organization which also worked on the promotion of joint arms 
production, helped coordinate the acquisition of military aircraft and aimed at further coordinating 
defence policy within Europe. Eurogroup was also a forum for members to press other members to 
meet their respective defence requirements for NATO and discuss the status of, or upgrades needed to, 
each other’s armed forces.[1] However, France was not a member of Eurogroup owing to its association 
with NATO.  
The most definitive step WEU made towards a distinct European defence identity came in 1976 with the 
formation of the IEPG to deal with the sharing of defence materiel procurement.[2] France joined IEPG 
since it was associated with WEU instead of NATO. Though it was formed to assist the coordination of 
arms conception and production, differences in philosophy of what constituted joint conception and 
production, as well as differences in terms of how Western Europe and the United States and how 
individual members of WEU and NATO conceived of these terms, served to limit what IPEG could 
actually accomplish.  
According to a Rand corporation report of the 1980s, the main obstacle for IPEG achieving collective 
weapon development was the difficulty in identifying 'even two weapons systems' that could meet a 
specific country's time and military requirements. The second obstacle was that the 'family of weapons 
concept,' favoured by the US, was not capable of providing the structure at the development stage that 
West Europeans preferred.[3] This concept was based on the idea to have two or more countries to 
produce, for example, short and medium range missiles, with one country producing one 
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missile, and another country producing the other. However, whether it was SAC, IEPG, Eurogroup, or 
FINABEL, individual countries' needs and means to produce arms (in contrast to collective European 
needs means) played a large role in the selection, implementation  and ultimate success of certain 
defence projects. For example, the French came to assume control over numerous projects over time, 
such as the Alpha Jet Trainer, and also the Atlantic maritime patrol program, at times financing the 
project alone which in turn afforded them a high level of control over the project as a whole.[4] The 
Transall Transport Aircraft (C-160) was a successful collaboration between France and Germany to 
jointly produce a military transport aircraft in the 1960s. However, it did not represent a fully European 
project since only France and Germany were involved in its production.[5]   
The British were involved in a 'Family of Weapons' project, building medium range surface to air missiles 
and aircraft with European partners. Despite repeatedly stating the need for greater cooperation in 
arms production in order to prevent Europe from falling behind in terms of technological development, 
the reoccurring problem in achieving cooperation in the field of arms production came from individual 
countries' desire to maintain political independence, and limitations in domestic market and 
manufacturing conditions.[6]   
A survey of British and French government records relating to the coordination of arms production 
reveals that for the British, their principal concern was lowering costs. For the French, the objective was 
to establish weapons production outside the sphere of NATO and the US. Another tendency on the part 
of the British and French governments on this issue was their alternating support for, and then pull-back 
from, the bodies they established to encourage coordinated weapons production. Their recognition of 
the need to support European technological development and R&D, in addition to the desire to protect 
West European manufacturing, would generate support for revitalizing an existing organ, such as SAC, or 
the creation of a new as the IEPG. However, domestic political interests, in addition to practical issues 
relating the implementation of these programs, would impede their work and progress, leading to the 
stalling and at times dissolution of these organs.  
After almost a decade of relative inactivity, the French attempted to revitalize SAC in December 1981 
when the State Secretary to the Ministry of Defence Georges Lemoine, stated that cooperation between 
SAC and the WEU Assembly should increase, and that with the consent of the WEU Council, SAC could 
be placed at the disposal of the Assembly to promote this cooperation. However, his recommendation 
was not followed through, and SAC was closed in 1989. IEPG continued to function until its name was 
changed to Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) in May 1993 to reflect the addition of 6 new 
members, and continued functioning until May 23rd 2005.[7]  
Control of armaments- ACA    
At WEU's inception the control of arms was seen as a method of fostering trust between members after 
the Second World War, and remained one of WEU's main tasks throughout its existence. The control of 
weapons therefore was a central competence for WEU in its formative years as Britain and France 
wanted to ensure that the FRG was honouring its commitment to not engage in the manufacturing of 
the armaments defined in Annexes II and III to Protocol III of the Brussels Treaty, specifically atomic, 
biological and chemical (ABC) weapons and certain conventional types.  
The idea was to enable WEU to control and report maximum and actual armed forces levels and types to 
the Assembly in order to build confidence among members, preventing them from becoming suspicious 
of one another, which could upset European stability and inhibit the process of European integration. 
Article19, Protocol IV of the modified Brussels treaty outlined the appropriate levels of Weapons 
production at a European level, and WEU formed the Agency for Arms Control (ACA) in 1954 to assess 
and report on member nations' arms levels. Protocol IV also established the parameters through which 
ACA would operate, and made it responsible to the WEU Council. The ACA 
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functioned by conducting inspections of members’ armed forces, or, in the case of members' forces 
under the control of NATO, relied on reports supplied by NATO to provide the needed information. 
Protocol IV also stipulated how members should notify ACA of their arms stock levels, and how 
members that contravened the treaty regulations could be sanctioned. Until it was closed in 1985, ACA 
accounted for a significant portion of WEU's budget.  
Though the Brussels Treaty established ACA to control arms, it was limited in its ability to do so as a 
result of 'Treaty vs. practical' control, since it was not given authority over the signatories of the 
modified Brussels Treaty (or rather, the signatories had not submitted themselves to ACA's authority) to 
control their maximum levels of forces and weapons. This meant that ACA had to rely on the 
cooperation of WEU's members to fulfil its mission. The ACA's role was complicated by the withdrawal 
of France in 1966 from NATO's integrated command structure (a development which was examined in 
section 1 dealing with WEU/NATO relations). France never ratified the convention which was intended 
to allow the ACA to audit French armaments' levels. From the British perspective, the French withdrawal 
from NATO's integrated military command would weaken not only NATO, but also the WEU even though 
France was still a WEU member. However, in June 1968, the French delegation to the WEU, re-affirmed 
France's commitment to European defence and security, and pledged to respect the limits on and 
inspections of French air and land forces with the exception of nuclear weapons, and to report those 
levels to the WEU.  
In relation to the issue of auditing levels of ABC weapons, there was a degree of consistency between 
the British and French positions towards WEU armament control, and it was to keep these weapons 
from being controlled. The WEU Council, though it was theoretically permitted to do, did not make use 
of the modified Brussels treaty provisions to establish any role for the ACA to control ABC weapons. 
Though plans were made to hire a “Nuclear Weapons expert,’ to help with inspection and prescription 
activities, the WEU tended to defer to EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
when it came to the auditing of Atomic weapons’ production and levels in Europe.[8]  
Generally speaking, British and French attitudes towards ACA can be summarised by the decade. In the 
1950s to early 1960s, ACA was used primarily to control West German re-armament. Beginning with the 
withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated command, from the mid-1960s to the 1980s, West 
Germany came to be seen as an important partner in European defence and control of its arms industry 
was more a matter of formality and cooperation, rather than fear. In the 1980s, as a result of the 
perspective that all signatories of the Modified Brussels Treaty should be treated equally, ACA came to 
be seen as outdated, and was abolished in April 1985.  
[1]http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1975/jun/19/europeanprogramme#S5CV0893
P0_19750619_CWA_285 [2] It is important to note that IPEG's activities did not grow significantly until 
December 1st 1991 in Maastricht, when WEU ministers decided to pursue increased cooperation in the 
field of armaments in order to create a European Armaments Agency. The next year in Bonn, the 
Defence ministers of the 13 IPEG member states (Luxembourg , Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark, Portugal, France, Spain, Germany, Greece, Turkey,  United Kingdom, Italy ) agreed to transfer 
IPEG's functions to the WEU, which was completed in May 1993 at a conference in Rome, where the 
name was changed to Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and six new members (Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Sweden) were added. [3] Covington, Terrel G, Keith W. 
Brendley, Mary E. Chenoweth, A RAND NOTE, “A review of European Arms Collaboration and Prospects 
for its Expansion Under the Independent European Program Group,'' (July 1987, the Rand Corporation) 
p. Vii. [4] Ibid., p. VIII [5] Ibid., p. 3. France joined the IEPG because it operated outside of NATO, rather 
than Eurogroup which operated 'within the framework of NATO. [6] Rand, p. x. [7] WEU website. IEPG 
page, located at: http://www.weu.int/weag/weag.htm, retrieved: September 9th 2014. In the 
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early 1970s, the FRG raised the issue of disbanding the SAC. [8] “French delegation to the WEU Council 
on questions to the WEU Assembly about the spread of Nuclear energy and defence issues,” (London, 
January 20th 1978) in WEU Archives, Secretary General / Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1977, File 
202.415.30, Volume 1/1.  
